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In the event of a serious pandemic inﬂ  uenza outbreak, 
businesses must play a key role in protecting employees’ 
health and safety. With regard to pandemic inﬂ  uenza miti-
gation recommendations requiring social distancing, we 
examined whether some US employees would dispropor-
tionately fail to comply because of job insecurity and ﬁ  nan-
cial problems associated with missing work. We used the 
2006 Harvard School of Public Health Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza 
Survey and multivariable logistic regression to determine 
whether employment characteristics such as inability to 
work from home, lack of pay when absent from work, and 
self-employment would be associated with less ability to 
comply with recommendations. We found that inability to 
work from home, lack of paid sick leave, and income are 
associated with working adults’ ability to comply and should 
be major targets for workplace interventions in the event of 
a serious outbreak.
T
he world needs a detailed operational blueprint for the 
best way to get through 12–24 months of a pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza outbreak; that type of planning must be on the 
agenda of every public health agency, school board, state 
legislature, and business (1). In January 2008, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention outlined several recom-
mendations (2). In the event of a serious outbreak, employ-
ers must play a key role in protecting employees’ health 
and safety (2). Speciﬁ  cally, businesses should “forecast 
and allow for employee absences during a pandemic due 
to factors such as personal illness, family member illness, 
community containment measures and quarantines, school 
and/or business closures, and public transportation clo-
sures” and workers should “plan for the possible reduction 
or loss of income if [they are] unable to work or if place of 
employment is closed” (2).
Should social distancing from the workplace become 
a reality, some members of the US workforce may be dis-
proportionately vulnerable to compliance failure and nega-
tive outcomes of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic because of real and 
perceived job insecurity and ﬁ  nancial problems associated 
with missing work. Previous research suggests that com-
pliance with recommendations in emergency situations 
reﬂ  ects the interaction of many modiﬁ  able and nonmodiﬁ  -
able factors, including how persons perceive their personal 
and family risk, what resources they have available, what 
negative consequences they anticipate as a result of com-
pliance, their socioeconomic status, and how well ofﬁ  cial 
planning efforts are organized (3–6). Attitudes toward the 
use of social distancing to mitigate outbreaks of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome, smallpox, or avian inﬂ  uenza 
may be inﬂ  uenced by largely modiﬁ  able problems that peo-
ple associate with isolation, such as not being able to get 
healthcare or prescription drugs and losing pay or jobs for 
missing work (7). Indeed, more than one third of US em-
ployees say that they would not get paid if they had to stay 
home from work because of a severe outbreak of pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza, and less than one third believe that they could 
work from home for 1 month (8).
We hypothesized that working adults who are unable 
to work from home and who do not have sick leave will 
have less ability to comply with pandemic inﬂ  uenza isola-
tion recommendations that require missing work because 
of fear of losing their job or business and serious ﬁ  nancial 
problems that would arise from missing work. To test our 
hypothesis, we assessed the relative independent contribu-
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tion of selected employment and sociodemographic char-
acteristics on working adults’ ability to comply with pan-




We used data from the 2006 Harvard School of Pub-
lic Health (HSPH) Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Survey, a random 
digit–dial survey sponsored by the HSPH Project on the 
Public and Biological Security. The survey was conducted 
to provide information with regard to the public’s reaction 
to the possible use of social distancing and other nonphar-
maceutical interventions during a severe outbreak of pan-
demic inﬂ   uenza. Survey questions assessed willingness 
and ability to comply with public health recommendations 
in 3 domains: home, school, and work.
The target population was adults >18 years of age, who 
lived in the United States. During September 28 through 
October 25, 2006, International Communications Research 
(Media, PA, USA) surveyed a representative sample of 
adults >18 years of age, including an oversample of adults 
with children <18 years of age in the household. Sampling 
procedures are described elsewhere (8). Response rate was 
36% and cooperation rate was 75%, which produced a to-
tal of 1,697 completed interviews (8). Because adults with 
children were oversampled to gauge the possible effect of 
community mitigation on families, data were weighted to 
reﬂ  ect the actual proportion of the total adult population. In 
addition, to compensate for nonresponse bias and unequal 
probability of selection and to ensure that demographic 
groups were represented in their actual proportion in the 
adult population, we weighted sample data to the most 
recent US census data available from the Current Popula-
tion Survey (www.census.gov/cps) for gender, age, race, 
region, and education.
Employment characteristics for the full sample were 
50% employed full time, 13% employed part time, 36% 
unemployed, and 1% unknown. Our study focused on 
employment-related constraints that may limit ability to 
comply with isolation recommendations; therefore, we 
analyzed responses from only the 1,101 respondents who 
were employed either full or part time (Table 1). A small 
percentage of employed respondents refused to answer 
some items in the survey (e.g., 15% refused income, 3% 
education, 2% race).
Outcome Variables: Indicators of Ability to Comply
Employed respondents were asked a series of ques-
tions to assess real or perceived constraints with regard to 
their ability to comply with pandemic inﬂ  uenza mitigation 
strategies that require isolation from the workplace. The 
4 dependent variables were positive responses to the fol-
lowing statements: “It is likely that I or a member of my 
household would lose a job or business as a result of hav-
ing to stay home for 7–10 days” (dichotomized; “very” and 
“somewhat” likely represented a positive response and “not 
too” and “not at all” likely represented a negative response); 
and “I would have serious ﬁ  nancial problems if I stayed 
away from work for 7–10 days, 1 month, or 3 months.” 
The latter questions used a split sample, whereby only re-
spondents who answered “no” or “don’t know” to the 7–10 
day duration were asked about ﬁ  nancial problems that they 
would have at 1 month, and only those who answered “no” 
or “don’t know” to having serious ﬁ  nancial problems at 
1 month were asked about the 3-month period. Many un-
adjusted prevalence estimates for each outcome variable 
(Table 2) have been described in a descriptive study that 
used the 2006 HSPH Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Survey (8).
Predictor Variables
To assess the effect of potentially modiﬁ  able employ-
ment-related constraints on compliance with recommen-
dations that require missing work, we chose key predictor 
variables that represented selected employment character-
istics; i.e., inability to work from home, lack of pay when 
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Table 1. Sample characteristics of 1,101 employed respondents, 
2006 Harvard School of Public Health Pandemic Influenza 
Survey* 
Characteristic  % Respondents
Female 54
Age, y 
 18–30  28
 31–50  48
>51 24
Annual household Income 
 <$30,000  18
 $30,000–$49,000  19
 $50,000–$74,000  19
>$75,000 29
Education
  Less than HS  12
  HS graduate or HS plus technical school  29
  Some college, no degree  25
  College degree or more  31
Race/ethnicity 
 African-American  11
 Hispanic  14
 Other  7
 White  66
Residence
 Urban  73
 Rural    27
Employment 
 Part  time  21
   Full time  79
*HS, high school. Alll samples are weighted. Entries may not total 100% 
because of refused or missing responses. RESEARCH
absent from work, and self-employment status (Table 2). 
With regard to employment-related constraints, <1% of re-
spondents refused to answer 2 questions.
Covariates
To assess the potentially disproportionate difﬁ  culties 
that low-income and urban populations may face if asked 
to stay home from work in the event of a serious outbreak, 
we included income and urban residence in all models. 
Other sociodemographic and personal characteristics as-
sessed were education, race/ethnicity, age, sex, self-report-
ed health status, and self-reported knowledge of pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza.
Statistical Analysis
Structured analytical approaches have improved pre-
dictions of behavior in emergency situations, modeling 
the joint effects of several factors on planned behavior (3). 
Therefore, to identify factors that may lead to dispropor-
tionate vulnerability in the event of a serious outbreak, we 
used multivariable logistic regression to model the pre-
dicted probability that some groups of working adults (de-
lineated by employment characteristics such as inability to 
work from home, lack of pay when absent from work, and 
self-employment) may be less able than identiﬁ  ed referent 
groups to comply with pandemic inﬂ  uenza mitigation strat-
egies that require voluntary isolation from work.
Each outcome used 1 full model; all models controlled 
simultaneously for all key predictors as well as covariates 
such as income, urban residence, age, race/ethnicity, edu-
cation, gender, self-reported health status, and self-reported 
knowledge of pandemic inﬂ  uenza. We conducted a com-
plete case analysis and analyzed only those 1,101 respon-
dents who reported being employed either full or part time. 
Tests of signiﬁ  cance were estimated at p<0.05, and 95% 
conﬁ  dence intervals (CIs) were reported for all odds ra-
tios (ORs). To adjust for unequal probabilities of selection 
and for potential nonresponse bias, we applied individual 
weighting factors to all estimates. The analysis was con-
ducted with SAS software version 9.2 (Cary, NC, USA) by 
using the PROC SURVEYLOGISTIC procedure and prob-
ability sampling weights.
Results
Perceived Likelihood of Losing Job or Business
Of the employed respondents, 28% reported that they 
likely would lose their job or business as a result of having 
to stay home from work for 7–10 days in the event of a 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza outbreak (Table 2). Our multivariable 
models elucidated differential vulnerability by lack of paid 
sick leave, income level of respondents, and urban resi-
dence (Table 3). Those respondents who would not be paid 
if kept from work were almost 5× more likely than those 
who would receive pay (OR 4.72) to say that they would 
likely lose their job or business as a result of having to stay 
home from work for 7–10 days.
Respondent income also was associated with reported 
likelihood of losing a job or business. Those who earned 
<$30,000 per year were 4× more likely than those who 
earned >$75,000 per year (OR 4.31) and those who earned 
$30,000–$49,000 per year and $50,000–$74,000 per year 
were ≈2× more likely than those who earned >$75,000 
per year (ORs 1.70 and 2.08, respectively) to say that they 
would likely lose their job or business as a result of having 
to miss work in the event of a serious outbreak.
Urban residence was associated with limited ability to 
comply with recommendations that require missing work. 
Respondents living in urban areas were ≈70% more likely 
than those living in rural areas to say that they would likely 
lose their job or business as a result of having to stay home 
for 7–10 days in the event of an outbreak (OR 1.66).
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Table 2. Prevalence estimates for responses of 1,101 employed respondents (unadjusted), 2006 Harvard School of Public Health 
Pandemic Influenza Survey* 
Variable
No.
responses % Yes  % No 
% Don’t 
know 
Outcome variables representing ability to comply with pandemic influenza mitigation recommendations 
  If you were asked to stay home for 7–10 days and avoid contact with anyone outside  
  your household, would you or someone in your household lose your job or business?  
1,073 28 71 1
  Would it become a serious financial problem if you stayed out of work for 7–10 days?  1,072 25 74 1
  Would it become a serious financial problem if you stayed out of work for 1 month?   806† 42 55 2
  Would it become a serious financial problem if you stayed out of work for 3 months?   464‡ 45 51 4
Key predictor variables representing employment-related constraints on compliance 
  Unable to work from home for 1 month in the event of a serious outbreak  1,073 69 29 2
   Would not be paid if kept from work because of a serious outbreak  1,071 42 35 22
 Self-employed  1,072 16 84 –
*All estimates are weighted. Cell counts may not total 100% due to refused or missing responses. Sample size for each question varies due to refused 
and missing responses. 
†Split sample; question asked only of those who responded “no” or “don’t know” to financial problems after 7–10 days. 
‡Split sample; question asked only of those who responded “no” or “don’t know” to financial problems after 1 month. Employment and Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Recommendations
Perceived Likelihood of Experiencing 
Serious Financial Problems
Certain employment characteristics and respondent 
income levels were associated with the likelihood that 
working adults would experience serious ﬁ  nancial prob-
lems and thus be less able to comply with isolation recom-
mendations, if required to miss work for long periods of 
time (Table 3). Respondents who were self-employed were 
twice as likely as those who worked for an employer to say 
that they would experience serious ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culties if 
isolated from work for 7–10 days (OR 2.09). Those who 
were not able to work from home were signiﬁ  cantly more 
likely than those who were able to work from home to say 
that they would experience serious ﬁ  nancial problems if 
isolated from work for durations of 7–10 days, 1 month, 
and 3 months (ORs 1.57, 1.91, 1.65, respectively).
Respondent income also was associated with likeli-
hood of experiencing serious ﬁ  nancial problems if the 
respondent were kept from work because of an outbreak 
of pandemic inﬂ  uenza, although the models showed in-
teresting patterns, depending on the duration of isolation. 
If isolated from work for 7–10 days, those who earned 
<$30,000 per year were 3× more likely than those who 
earned >$75,000 per year to say that they would experi-
ence substantial ﬁ  nancial problems (OR 3.26). At 1 month 
of isolation, all those in low- and middle-income groups 
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Table 3. Likelihood of compliance with work-related pandemic influenza isolation strategies, by employment-related constraints and
sociodemographics*
Likelihood,† OR (95% CI)  
Serious financial problems 
Variable Referent
Lose job or 
business, n = 928‡  7–10 d, n = 927§  1 mo, n = 754¶  3 mo, n = 472# 
Employment-related constraints
  Unable to work from  
  home for 1 mo 
Able 0.99 (0.63–1.56)  1.57 (1.02–2.51)** 1.91 (1.30–2.79)†† 1.65 (1.06–2.52)**
  Would not be paid if  
  kept from work  
Paid 4.72 (2.94–7.57)†† 3.23 (2.03–5.13)†† 2.93 (2.07–4.14)†† 1.75 (1.14–2.62)‡‡
  Self-employed   Works for 
someone else 
1.09 (0.64–1.85)  2.09 (1.25–3.49)‡‡ 0.68 (0.42–1.14)  0.66 (0.38–1.16) 
Sociodemographic characteristics
 Income    >$75,000
  <$30,000  4.31 (2.43–7.63)†† 3.26 (1.85–5.75)†† 3.29 (1.78–6.05)†† 3.52 (1.38–8.98)‡‡
  $30,000–$49,000  1.70 (1.01–3.02)** 1.57 (0.93–2.64)  2.93 (1.81–4.75)†† 1.46 (0.79–2.69) 
  $50,000–$74,000  2.08 (1.25–3.48)‡‡ 1.09 (0.64–1.84)  1.89 (1.25–2.88)‡‡ 1.27 (0.78–2.07) 
 Urban  residence    Rural 1.66 (1.07–2.56)** 1.30 (0.84–2.01)  1.14 (0.77–1.68)  0.66 (0.41–1.06) 
Education College
     Less than HS  2.40 (0.84–6.80)  1.73 (0.62–4.80)  1.24 (0.36–4.28)  0.45 (0.06–3.29) 
     HS graduate or  
  HS  plus  technical  school 
2.03 (1.17–3.51)‡‡ 1.62 (0.95–2.75)  1.17 (0.69–1.99)  0.41 (0.20–1.07) 
     Some college  1.15 (0.63–2.05)  1.25 (0.73–2.14)  0.89 (0.55–1.42)  0.71 (0.38–1.31) 
Race/Ethnicity White
     African-American  1.74 (0.92–3.29)  0.56 (0.26–1.18)  1.51 (0.77–2.95)  0.73 (0.31–1.70) 
     Hispanic  1.55 (0.83–2.88)  0.65 (0.32–1.34)  0.74 (0.37–1.48)  1.52 (0.65–3.57) 
     Other  2.23 (0.92–5.43)  1.22 (0.45–3.26)  0.71 (0.27–1.86)  0.81 (0.29–2.31) 
 Age,  y  >51
     18–30  1.99 (1.09–3.66)** 1.08 (0.56–2.05)  0.73 (0.40–1.32)  1.54 (0.75–3.15) 
     31–50  1.09 (0.71–1.71)  1.49 (0.96–2.33)  1.04 (0.71–1.53)  1.38 (0.88–2.16) 
  Gender  F 0.77 (0.53–1.13)  0.84 (0.57–1.22)  1.07 (0.76–1.51)  1.07 (0.72–1.61) 
  Good health status  Poor health  0.58 (0.29–1.13)  0.50 (0.25–0.97)** 0.96 (0.40–2.29)  0.60 (0.22–1.69) 
  Knowledge of pandemic 
 influenza   
Never heard of  0.59 (0.37–0.96)  0.79 (0.49–1.30)  1.23 (0.73–2.06)  1.02 (0.53–1.94) 
–2LL 735.72 740.38 860.05 605.98
*Multivariable fitted logistic regression models describing the odds that some groups may be less able than identified referent groups to comply with 
pandemic influenza mitigation strategies that require voluntary isolation from work. All estimates are weighted and control for age, race/ethnicity, 
education, gender, self-reported health status, and self-reported knowledge of pandemic influenza. OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; HS, high 
school; LL, log likelihood. Boldface indicates significance at p<0.05. 
†Response of persons employed full or part time to “If pandemic influenza remained in your community for some time, health officials might recommend 
that people stay home from work so they do not catch or spread the disease.” 
‡I or a member of my household would lose job or business as a result of having to stay home for 7–10 days. 
§I or a member of my household would have serious financial problems if I stayed away from work for the following period of time.
¶Split sample; question asked only of those who responded “no” or “don’t know” to financial problems after 7–10 days. 




were signiﬁ  cantly more likely than those in the highest 
income group to say that they would experience serious 
ﬁ  nancial problems if kept from work. There was a ﬁ  ne 
income gradient; those earning <$30,000 per year were 
3.29× more likely, those earning $30,000–$49,000 per 
year were 2.93× more likely, and those earning $50,000–
$74,000 per year were 1.89× more likely than those earn-
ing >$75,000 per year to say that staying away from work 
for 1 month would pose serious ﬁ  nancial problems. At 
3 months of isolation, the trend shifted somewhat. Low-
income workers were still signiﬁ  cantly more likely than 
high-income workers to say that they would have seri-
ous ﬁ  nancial problems if isolated from work (OR 3.52), 
indicating disproportionate vulnerability for low-income 
populations across all durations of isolation. However, at 
3 months, middle-income workers would not be more or 
less likely than those earning >$75,000 to say that they 
would experience serious ﬁ  nancial problems, indicating 
that a 3-month period of isolation would likely be difﬁ  -
cult for those in all income groups, including those in the 
highest income categories.
Discussion
The threat of a human inﬂ  uenza pandemic has greatly 
increased over the past several years with the emergence 
of highly virulent avian inﬂ   uenza viruses, notably sub-
type H5N1 (9), and the more recent emergence of subtype 
H1N1. Federal agencies have modeled the high probability 
of a serious pandemic inﬂ  uenza outbreak and have begun 
to institute national and state plans to reduce transmission 
and mitigate the disease (10). The inadequate supply of 
some vaccines and antiviral medications and insufﬁ  cient 
community mitigation planning have led to concern that 
the United States is inadequately prepared to deal with a 
pandemic (11).
Improving pandemic preparedness is critical, given 
the catastrophic consequences of inﬂ  uenza pandemics that 
have occurred in the past century, in 1918, 1957, and 1968; 
the severity of all past pandemics was substantial, rang-
ing from 700,000 deaths (in 1968) to >50 million deaths 
(in 1918) (1,11). Evidence to determine the most effective 
nonpharmaceutical intervention strategies is limited (12). 
Some strategies being suggested include targeted, layered 
containment (13), which involves antiviral drug treatment 
for identiﬁ  ed case-patients and prophylaxis for and quaran-
tine of their household members, school closures, and social 
distancing in the community and workplace (2,8,13,14). 
Research has suggested that US adults seem to possess a 
broad willingness to comply with response strategies that 
include social distancing, although some segments of the 
population will likely be less able to comply with isolation 
recommendations (8), particularly those related to isolation 
from the workplace.
This study may provide public health authorities with 
realistic expectations for the success or failure of proposed 
mitigation measures, given that some population subgroups 
may have less ability to comply with recommendations be-
cause of real or perceived job insecurity and ﬁ  nancial prob-
lems associated with missing work. Our ﬁ  ndings suggest 
that some employment characteristics (inability to work 
from home, lack of paid sick leave) are associated with 
working adults’ ability to comply with recommendations 
and will be major workplace intervention points (areas to 
target) in the event of a serious outbreak. In addition, so-
ciodemographic characteristics (particularly low-income 
status) put some workers at disproportionate risk of con-
tracting and spreading pandemic inﬂ  uenza because of their 
perceived inability to miss work. These assessments may 
help identify the conditions under which some groups will 
be disproportionately likely to fail to comply and may help 
with workplace efforts to plan accordingly and communi-
cate effectively in the event of a serious outbreak of pan-
demic inﬂ  uenza.
Job insecurity, whether real or perceived, is a real 
consideration for many working adults. US health authori-
ties recommend that to prepare for a pandemic, businesses 
should establish policies for nonpunitive liberal leave and 
ﬂ  exible worksite accommodations (2). However, we know 
of no legal precedent for mandatory job protection in the 
event of public health emergencies. Our study found that 
employees without paid sick leave, those with low income, 
and those who live in urban areas fear losing their jobs 
should they comply with recommendations to stay home 
in the event of a serious outbreak of pandemic inﬂ  uenza. 
Those respondents who said that they would not be paid if 
kept from work were almost 5× more likely as those who 
would receive pay to say that they would lose their job or 
business as a result of having to stay home from work. We 
were not surprised by this ﬁ  nding, given the long history 
of social epidemiology literature (e.g., the Whitehall stud-
ies) that has documented the effect of occupational status 
or grade, organizational injustice, job stress, and workplace 
power differentials on both job insecurity and disease out-
comes (15–20). The effect of lack of paid sick leave pro-
vides insight into a measure of inequality in the work force, 
such that some groups of employees (e.g., those in minimum 
wage jobs or without paid sick leave), because of concerns 
about job security that stem from their workplace status, 
lack the power to choose to stay home from work in the 
event of an outbreak. Notably, across all income categories, 
low- and middle-income workers were signiﬁ  cantly more 
likely than high-income workers to say that they would be 
likely to lose their job or business as a result of staying 
home for 7–10 days in the event of an outbreak. Those re-
spondents living in urban areas also were 60% more likely 
than those living in rural areas to fear job insecurity. This 
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fear could pose substantial problems for pandemic inﬂ  uen-
za mitigation because those in urban areas may be strongly 
encouraged to remain isolated to avoid virus spread in con-
ditions of population density and crowding.
Financial problems also are likely to weigh heav-
ily on the minds of US workers during a pandemic, and 
these problems may be part of the complexity of factors 
that comprise compliance considerations. Although US 
health authorities have recommended that businesses de-
velop policies for employee compensation in the event of 
an inﬂ  uenza pandemic that causes workplace absences (2), 
we know of no precedent requiring that paid sick leave be 
granted (by employers or state or federal government) to 
employees who comply with isolation recommendations 
and miss work in the event of a public health emergency. 
Our study has elucidated some employment characteristics 
that are associated with the likelihood that workers think 
they would experience serious ﬁ  nancial problems if they 
had to miss work; inability to work from home and lack of 
paid sick leave were associated with reports of experienc-
ing serious ﬁ  nancial problems if isolated from work over 
the 3 periods: 7–10 days, 1 month, and 3 months. Respon-
dent income was another signiﬁ  cant predictor of serious 
ﬁ  nancial problems that may limit ability to comply with 
isolation recommendations. Even relatively short periods 
of isolation from the workplace (7–10 days) would be a 
problem for low-income workers, and if an outbreak were 
serious enough to warrant 1-month isolation recommenda-
tions, persons in low- and middle-income groups would 
have more difﬁ  culty complying than would upper-income 
groups, thus limiting the effectiveness of mitigation strate-
gies. Moreover, at 3 months’ of isolation, persons from all 
income levels, especially low-income, would likely experi-
ence serious ﬁ  nancial problems.
Strengths of our study include its practical signiﬁ  cance; 
our ﬁ  ndings may help preparedness planners ﬁ  nd work-
speciﬁ  c strategies that may increase the likelihood of com-
pliance with isolation recommendations. These strategies 
may include working with employers to ensure work-from-
home or sick leave capabilities for nonessential employees 
and planning to provide state or federal supplementary in-
come support and job protection for workers who would not 
be paid if they missed work because of ofﬁ  cial pandemic 
mitigation recommendations. Other countries have imple-
mented similar measures in emergencies; for example, dur-
ing the 2003 pandemic of severe acute respiratory disease, 
the government of Singapore provided ﬁ  nancial support to 
citizens who had to stay home to prevent the spread of the 
disease (21). In the United States, no such measures have 
been taken to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, but 
for other emergencies such as hurricanes and ﬂ  oods, fed-
eral income support has been provided to victims by way 
of disaster relief funds. In the event of a serious outbreak 
of pandemic inﬂ  uenza, when timely action will be needed 
to encourage and ensure isolation compliance, an exist-
ing mechanism for delivering ﬁ  nancial support to affected 
persons is unemployment insurance. Currently, eligibility 
requirements for this beneﬁ  t are limited to employees who 
involuntarily lose their job, but this requirement could be 
changed to use an existing system to disperse lump-sum 
payments to those ﬁ  nancially affected by a pandemic, if the 
severity of an outbreak warranted isolation from the work-
place for long periods.
Findings from our study should be considered in light 
of a few limitations, including the 36% response rate. Low 
response rates can bias samples, reﬂ  ecting systematic dif-
ferences between responders and the population from which 
they were drawn, thus limiting the external validity of esti-
mates (extrapolation to the general population). However, 
the 1-month period of the survey (and thus limited time 
for callbacks) may mirror what might be necessary in the 
event of a pandemic, in which public surveys with a rapid 
turnaround time are necessary to gauge public knowledge 
and resource needs in an emergency situation. We point 
to research that suggests that the results of weighted data 
from surveys of shorter duration are similar to those based 
on surveys of longer duration and higher response rates and 
can be used without an unacceptable risk for bias (22,23). 
Furthermore, the HSPH Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Survey, as it 
relates to our ﬁ  ndings about job insecurity, did not assess 
perceptions of job loss versus reality of job loss, nor did 
it assess reasons why some respondents perceived that job 
loss would be a consequence for missing work for 7–10 
days in the event of a serious outbreak. Future population 
surveys could attempt to disentangle these beliefs to inform 
policy and communication aimed at enabling compliance 
with workplace isolation strategies to quell the spread of a 
future pandemic.
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